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I. Introduction 
In criminal cases, the stakes regarding DNA evidence run 
high. The admissibility of one piece of DNA evidence can alter the 
outcome of the case. Imagine that the prosecution charges Mr. 
Smith with murder. The police found what they believe is Mr. 
Smith’s DNA on the victim at the scene of the crime. They send 
the sample to the Department of Forensic laboratory. Technicians 
at the laboratory use a certain method of DNA interpretation 
called “human interpretation.” Based on this method, the lab 
reports an inconclusive result. The result may be inconclusive 
because the sample is too complex (contains too many 
contributors) or is degraded or contaminated. The result might be 
inconclusive because the DNA does not belong to Mr. Smith. 
Regardless, without conclusive DNA evidence tying Mr. Smith to 
the scene of the crime, the prosecution may be unable to meet its 
burden of proof that Mr. Smith committed the murder. Now 
imagine that the Department of Forensic laboratory recently 
implemented a new type of DNA interpretation technology. 
Instead of the traditional human interpretation technique, the 
lab uses new computerized DNA interpretation technology. Using 
the technology, the lab yields conclusive results. An expert for the 
prosecution testifies that Mr. Smith’s DNA matches the sample 
DNA found on the victim, and a jury convicts Mr. Smith.  
In criminal cases, the prosecution carries the heavy burden of 
proof––beyond a reasonable doubt––for each and every element of 
a crime.1 In the past few decades, technological advances have 
                                                                                                     
 1. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (discussing the vital role 
that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard plays in criminal procedure and 
holding that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged”). 
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aided the prosecution in carrying this burden. Specifically, the 
advent of DNA technology allows prosecutors to conclusively 
allege, in numerical terms, the likelihood that a particular 
defendant’s DNA is present at a particular location. Admissibility 
of scientific evidence hinges on standards developed in the early 
1900s.2 These standards continuously developed over subsequent 
decades.3 Like many areas of the law, the standards may struggle 
to keep up with evolving technology. Recently, innovative 
computer interpretation programs began replacing widely 
accepted human interpretation of DNA evidence.4 One such 
computer program is TrueAllele. According to its website, 
TrueAllele objectively infers genetic profiles from DNA samples, 
and automatically matches the resulting profiles against 
available profiles contained in large databases.5 In practice, 
TrueAllele sometimes yields conclusive results of DNA samples 
when human interpretation of the same sample does not.6  
                                                                                                     
 2. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(discussing one standard for admission of scientific testimony). 
 3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993) 
(overruling Frye and discussing a second standard for admission of scientific 
evidence). 
 4. See William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still 
Controversial in Some Cases, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2012, at 18 [hereinafter 
Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics], 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2214459 (discussing one 
computerized DNA interpretation program whose “sales pitch appears to be 
working”). 
 5. See DNA Casework, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/systems/ 
casework.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (describing the TrueAllele program) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Furthermore, in Maryland 
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of collecting an arrestee’s DNA by taking and analyzing a cheek swab. See id. at 
1980 (“When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause [and detain 
the suspect in custody], taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s 
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking 
procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). This decision will 
likely result in an expansion of DNA databases. See id. at 1988 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the great expansion of fingerprint databases after the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of fingerprinting arrestees). 
 6. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
18 (“[TrueAllele] claim[s] it can be used in all types of cases, including 
problematic cases in which sample limitations render the test results less than 
perfectly reliable. Better yet, the system often produces statistics that are even 
more impressively incriminating than the statistics produced by conventional 
[DNA interpretation] methods.”).  
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The admissibility of the computerized results is another 
matter. Courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are ill-
equipped to gauge the admissibility of these complicated 
technologies.7 Consequently, both sides typically bring experts 
into court to educate the judge or jury about the new technology, 
and discuss its admissibility.8 Experts, however, are rarely 
neutral parties. And disputes about the admissibility of the 
results often occur.9  
When analyzing the admissibility of emerging scientific 
technologies, judges balance various competing principles of 
criminal law. These principles include accuracy and fairness.10 
While the computerized DNA technology may claim to yield 
accurate results (and may in fact yield accurate results), defense 
attorneys––and to some extent judges––must test this claim and 
uphold due process by admitting the evidence in a fair manner.  
This Note discusses the admissibility of TrueAllele, a 
computerized DNA interpretation technology. The Note begins, in 
Part II.A, with a discussion about the admissibility of scientific 
evidence in general, including the history and current state of the 
Frye and Daubert evidentiary standards. Part II.B analyzes the 
historical evolution of DNA. Part III introduces basic concepts 
required to understand DNA evidence, including amplification 
and both human and computerized statistical interpretation.11 
Part IV focuses on the current state of admissibility of the 
TrueAllele technology. And Part V discusses the admissibility of 
the TrueAllele technology in connection with the norms of 
criminal procedure, specifically accuracy and fairness. 
                                                                                                     
 7. See William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and 
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 52–53 (1989) 
[hereinafter Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing] (discussing the challenges and 
complexity of DNA typing). 
 8. See id. at 12 (noting that experts “sometimes disagree about the 
interpretation and statistical characterization of [DNA] test results”).  
 9. See id. at 20 (describing one case where a dispute arose about whether 
the TrueAllele expert had “cherry-picked” his data to reach a more 
incriminating result).  
 10. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 36–38 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
DRESSLER & THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (discussing accuracy and fairness as 
two norms of the criminal process). 
 11. A full discussion of the differences between human and computerized 
interpretation of biostatistics is beyond the scope of this Note.  
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II. The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence 
Traditionally, the admissibility of scientific evidence revolved 
around its reliability12––the more reliable the scientific evidence, 
the more likely the scientific community or a judge will accept 
and admit the evidence.13 But what is reliability? Reliability of 
scientific evidence is defined in many ways. For example, 
reliability may focus on the accuracy of the result,14 the accuracy 
of the process that led to the result,15 or what members of the 
relevant scientific community think about that process and 
result.16 All of these factors are important, and typically courts do 
not focus on just one.17 
Historically, courts have changed the definition of reliability, 
which in turn alters the admissibility standard of scientific 
evidence.18 This shift is traditionally attributed to a change in the 
                                                                                                     
 12. In addition, admissibility of scientific evidence, like all evidence, 
revolves around its relevance. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 22 (Robert C. Clarke et 
al. eds., 3d ed. 2013) (discussing the general principles of evidentiary relevance 
applicable to all admissible evidence). For the purposes of this Note, relevance is 
assumed arguendo because in almost all cases involving TrueAllele, the piece of 
evidence the prosecution seeks to admit against the defendant is relevant to the 
case.  
 13. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(discussing one standard for admission of scientific testimony); Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993) (same). 
 14. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (discussing the “known or potential error 
rate” as a factor important to a determination of reliability of scientific 
evidence). 
 15. See id. at 593–94 (discussing whether a technique “can be (and has 
been) tested” and “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation” as factors important to a determination of reliability of 
scientific evidence). 
 16. See id. (discussing whether a technique “can be (and has been) tested” 
and whether a technique has been “subjected to peer review and publication” 
and the “general acceptance” of the technique in the relevant scientific 
community as factors important to a determination of reliability of scientific 
evidence); Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (discussing whether a technique has “gained 
general acceptance in the particular field” as a factor important to a 
determination of reliability of scientific evidence). 
 17. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (using a five-factor test to 
determine admissibility of scientific evidence). 
 18. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (discussing the 
shift in admissibility standards and comparing Daubert and Frye, stating that 
“the Federal Rules of Evidence [and therefore, presumably Daubert] allow 
district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than 
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“gatekeeper”19 of scientific evidence. The gatekeeper is the person 
who stands between scientific evidence and its admissibility.20 In 
early cases, and in a minority of states today,21 the scientific 
community serves as the gatekeeper.22 In later cases and in a 
majority of states today,23 the judge serves as the gatekeeper.24 
The different definitions of reliability and the different 
gatekeepers affect the admissibility analysis of the scientific 
evidence.25 
                                                                                                     
would have been admissible under Frye”).  
 19. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (introducing the terminology of the 
“gatekeeping role” of the judge). 
 20. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter?: 
A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 477 (2005) 
(discussing Daubert’s “gatekeeping role” as the “most important[]” change and 
later concluding this change resulted in a new “[d]octrine [that] provides the 
framework by which judges analyze facts and decide cases, so changing that 
framework should presumably change outcomes”). Cheng and Yoon later 
suggest that “a state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in 
practice.” Id. at 503. 
 21. See Michael H. Graham, Reliability “Gatekeeping” under Daubert/ 
Kumho/Rule 702: Historical Development and Assessment, 5 HANDBOOK OF FED. 
EVID. § 702:5 (7th ed. 2013) (“Eleven states have specifically rejected 
Daubert . . . in favor of retaining the standards enunciated in Frye v. United 
States.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 22. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(recognizing that the evidence must have “gained general acceptance” in the 
particular scientific community in order to be admissible).  
 23. See Graham, supra note 21, § 702:5 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert, the 
standards set forth in that opinion have become the majority rule in 
the United States in analyzing expert opinion testimony. Currently, 
27 states have held that the Daubert standards are either helpful or 
controlling in their determinations regarding the admissibility of 
expert opinion evidence (citations omitted). 
 24. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 
(1993) (attributing the role of “gatekeeper” to the federal judge). 
 25. See generally Cheng & Yoon, supra note 20, at 503 (describing the 
different theories about whether a state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes 
any difference in practice). 
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A. Scientific Admissibility Doctrines 
1. The Frye Standard: General Acceptance 
In 1923, Mr. Frye was on trial for second-degree murder.26 
During the trial, the defense offered the testimony of a scientist 
who had conducted a “systolic blood pressure deception test”––an 
early version of a polygraph test27––to prove Mr. Frye was not 
hiding facts or his guilt.28 The theory supporting the deception 
test was that the “truth is spontaneous and comes without 
conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a 
conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure.”29 The 
defense offered the scientist as an expert to testify about the 
results obtained.30 The prosecution objected to the admissibility of 
the deception test, and the trial court sustained the objection and 
did not allow the expert to testify.31 On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the trial 
court’s decision32 using the following standard: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult 
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force 
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a 
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
                                                                                                     
 26. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
 27. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: 
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204 n.41 
(1980) (“The machine used in Frye was a forerunner of the modern polygraph 
and is more accurately described as a monograph, since, unlike the modern 
polygraph, it measured only one physiological response—blood pressure.”). 
 28. Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14. 
 29. Id. at 1014. 
 30. See id. (“Prior to the trial defendant was subjected to this deception 
test, and counsel offered the scientist who conducted the test as an expert to 
testify to the results obtained.”). 
 31. See id. (“[C]ounsel offered the scientist who conducted the test as an 
expert. . . . The [government objected], and the court sustained the objection. 
Counsel for defendant then offered to have the proffered witness conduct a test 
in the presence of the jury. This also was denied.”). 
 32. See id. (affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence).  
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have gained acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.33 
The appellate court denied the expert testimony because “the 
systolic blood pressure deception test [had] not yet gained such 
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and 
experiments thus far made.”34 
Put simply, the Frye standard requires that the relevant 
scientific community accept the scientific technique in question.35 
This acceptance launches the technique from the “experimental” 
stage to the “demonstrable” stage, and therefore allows for 
judicial recognition.36 Under the Frye standard, the relevant 
scientific community as a whole must accept the technique. One 
expert’s opinion, or even several experts’ opinions, may be 
insufficient to show that a particular technique has entered the 
demonstrable stage.37 The Frye standard, therefore, places the 
“gatekeeping” power with the scientific community. 
2. The Daubert Standard: A Five-Factor Balancing Test 
For decades courts analyzed scientific techniques under the 
Frye doctrine.38 In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.39 In 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Giannelli, supra note 27, at 1205 (“Frye imposes a special burden––
the technique must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.”). 
 36. See id. (“A novel technique must pass through an ‘experimental’ stage 
in which it is scrutinized by the scientific community. Only after the technique 
has been tested successfully in this stage and has passed into the ‘demonstrable’ 
stage will it receive judicial recognition.”). 
 37. See id. (“In contrast to the relevancy approach, it is not enough that a 
qualified expert, or even several experts, believes that a particular technique 
has entered the demonstrable stage . . . .”). 
 38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In 
the last 70 years since its formation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ 
test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel 
scientific evidence at trial.” (citing ERIC GREEN & CHARLES NESSON, PROBLEMS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 649 (1983))). 
 39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Daubert, the petitioners were children born with serious birth 
defects allegedly caused by their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, 
a prescription anti-nausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.40 Both sides presented well-credentialed 
experts to testify about Bendectin’s risk factor for human birth 
defects.41 Merrell Dow submitted an affidavit from Dr. Steven H. 
Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist, stating that he had 
reviewed more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 
patients, and no study had found Bendectin to be a substance 
capable of causing birth defects.42 The petitioners moved to admit 
eight experts of their own who concluded that Bendectin could 
cause birth defects.43 The petitioner’s experts’ conclusions were 
based in part on the “‘reanalysis’ of previously published 
epidemiological (human statistical) studies.”44 Following the Frye 
standard, the trial court denied admission of the petitioners’ eight 
experts.45 The court based its inadmissibility analysis on the fact 
the relevant scientific community did not “generally accept[]” the 
scientific techniques used by the petitioner’s experts.46 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the reanalysis of published studies 
because the experts generated this reanalysis solely for litigation, 
and the reanalysis had not undergone peer-review.47  
On appeal in the United States Supreme Court, the 
petitioners argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 582. 
 41. See id. at 582–83 (characterizing the respondent’s expert as “well-
credentialed” and characterizing the petitioner’s expert as possessing 
“impressive credentials”). 
 42. Id. at 582. 
 43. Id. at 583. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 583–84 (discussing how the trial court concluded that the 
petitioners’ evidence did not meet admissibility standards). 
 46. See id. at 584 (“The court declared that expert opinion based on a 
methodology that diverges significantly from the procedures accepted by 
recognized authorities in the field . . . cannot be shown to be ‘generally accepted 
as a reliable technique.’”). 
 47. See id. (“Contending that reanalysis is generally accepted by the 
scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by 
others in the field, the [Ninth Circuit] rejected petitioners’ reanalyses as 
‘unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process and generated 
solely for use in litigation.’”). 
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the Frye test,48 specifically Rule 702,49 which at the time provided 
that, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise.”50 The Supreme Court dismissed 
the Frye test as “rigid” and “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the 
Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’”51 After overruling 
Frye, the Court set forth a new test to place limits on the 
admissibility of scientific evidence in which the “trial judge must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted 
is not only relevant, but reliable.”52 
In Daubert, the Court offered five “general observations” to 
guide trial judges in their assessment of the reliability of a 
scientific theory or technique. These “general observations” are 
now known as the five Daubert factors. The Daubert factors 
include: (1) whether the technique “can be (and has been) 
tested;”53 (2) whether a technique has been “subjected to peer 
review and publication;”54 (3) “the known or potential rate of 
error;”55 (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation;”56 and (5) “general 
acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.57 The factors do 
not represent “a definitive checklist or test.”58 In fact, the 
majority stated that the inquiry into admissibility of scientific 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. at 587 (“Petitioners’ primary attack, however, is not on the 
content but on the continuing authority of the rule. They contend that the Frye 
test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
 49. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 was amended in 2000 and restyled in 2011. 
See FISHER, supra note 12, at 796 (discussing the changes to Rule 702). The Rule 
today contains more detail than in 1993. Id. 
 50. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). 
 51. Id. (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 589. 
 53. Id. at 593.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 594. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 593. 
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evidence is “a flexible one.”59 The Daubert standard squarely 
shifted the gatekeeping power from the scientific community to 
the judge.60  
 Ultimately, the Court remanded Daubert because the lower 
court focused too much on the ‘general acceptance in the scientific 
community’ factor.61 On remand, for the first time, a court acted 
as a gatekeeper and applied the Daubert five-factor test.62 Clearly 
frustrated with its new role,63 the Ninth Circuit begrudgingly 
took on the task of “resolv[ing] disputes among respected, well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their 
expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to 
what is and what is not ‘good science,’ and occasionally . . . reject 
such expert testimony because it was not ‘derived by the scientific 
method.’”64 After weighing most of the five Daubert factors,65 the 
court affirmed its original decision, once again rendering the 
eight experts’ testimonies inadmissible.66  
3. Post-Daubert’s Practical Impact and Comparing the Standards 
The Justices who decided Daubert most likely believed the 
Daubert test eased the standards for admission of scientific 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 594. 
 60. See id. at 597 (discussing the “gatekeeping role” of the judge). 
 61. Id. at 597–98. 
 62. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 63. See id. at 1315–16 (characterizing the task of applying the Daubert 
factors as “daunting,” “difficult,” and “uncomfortable”).  
 64. Id. at 1316. 
 65. See id. at 1317 n.4 (disregarding two of the Daubert factors––whether 
the technique employed “can be (and has been) tested” and what its “known or 
potential rate of error” might be––as too difficult to apply in this particular 
case).  
 66. See id. at 1321–22 (rendering the testimony inadmissible under the 
Daubert analysis). The court of appeals concluded that the petitioners’ experts’ 
testimony was not “helpful” under the second prong (relevance) of Rule 702. Id. 
at 1321. The experts’ substantive testimony did not conclude that the Bendectin 
actually caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. In addition, the testimony did not 
comment on the statistical likelihood that Bendectin actually caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The testimony, therefore, did not meet the standard of 
required proof of causation (preponderance of the evidence) and was ultimately 
not relevant. Id. at 1322. 
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evidence.67 In fact, just a few years later in 1997, the Supreme 
Court restated that the “Federal Rules of Evidence allow district 
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony 
than would have been admissible under Frye.”68 Other studies 
show, however, that the Daubert standard had little impact on 
the admissibility of expert testimony (at least in the civil 
sphere).69 The lack of impact may be, in part, because the ‘general 
acceptance in the scientific community’ factor serves as one of the 
five Daubert factors.70 Some judges inevitably give greater weight 
to this factor, and therefore, the Frye and Daubert tests may 
produce the same result.71  
B. Early Admissibility of DNA Evidence 
During the advent of DNA technology, courts applied the 
Frye and Daubert standards to DNA evidence. The initial 
acceptance of DNA evidence in the courts happened quickly, over 
the course of just a few years. As technology progresses, however, 
courts must constantly reevaluate the admissibility of DNA.  
                                                                                                     
 67. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 596 
(1993) (classifying the new Daubert standard as “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ 
of the Federal Rules” and discussing the allowance of “shaky but admissible 
evidence”). 
 68. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). 
 69. See, e.g., Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes for Admitting Expert 
Evidence In Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 251, 291–302 (2001) (examining Daubert’s effect on the proportion of 
challenged evidence excluded and its effect on summary judgment in civil cases); 
see also Cheng & Yoon, supra note 20, at 488–89 (examining the removal rates 
between jurisdictions employing different standards); Eric Helland & Jonathan 
Klick, Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate? An Empirical Assessment of the 
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 18–31 (2012) 
(examining state-to-state variance by measuring litigants’ likelihood of offering 
different types of expert witnesses). 
 70. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing “general acceptance” 
as one of the five Daubert factors).  
 71. See Dixon & Gill, supra note 69, at 299–300 (discussing studies that 
indicated that, in post-Daubert cases, general acceptance was no longer 
sufficient by itself for admission of evidence but a lack of general acceptance 
remained an important barrier to admission). 
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1. Early Controversies About the Admissibility of DNA Evidence 
After its introduction to the criminal forensics scene in 1987, 
DNA evidence quickly gained popularity in the United States.72 
Initially, members of the legal and law enforcement communities 
used the novel evidence conservatively;73 however, DNA evidence 
quickly gained traction once courts started admitting the new 
technology.74 Companies marketed DNA evidence to the public 
and prosecutors as impenetrable scientific evidence that would 
result in obtaining accurate convictions.75 Defense attorneys 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable 
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 476–77 
(1990) (discussing the early popularity of DNA evidence in the United States). 
 73. See id. at 477 n.56 (“In September 1987, only one-third of the nation’s 
crime lab directors thought DNA typing was ready for forensic use.” (citing 
Mark Thompson, DNA’s Troubled Debut, CAL. LAW., 1988, at 44)); id. (“Professor 
George Sensabaugh of the University of California at Berkeley, a researcher in 
the field of forensic science and DNA typing, predicted in 1987 that it would 
take another five years of research before the DNA typing technique would be 
able to pass muster in California courts.” (citing Isadora W. Lomhoff, By Their 
DNA, So Shall Ye Know Them, CAL. LAW., 1987, at 9)). 
 74. See id. 
In early 1988, consistent with such conservatism, California 
Attorney General John Van de Kamp held the firm position 
that DNA evidence was not ready for the courtroom. He 
explained, “We have every opportunity to botch this historic 
moment. How might we do that? By getting mesmerized with 
DNA's potential and slipping into a counterproductive 
scramble to rush the technology from laboratory to courtroom 
in record time.”  
(citing Mark Thompson, DNA’s Troubled Debut, CAL. LAW., 1988, at 40, 42);  
cf. id. 
However, only one year later, seeing that other jurisdictions 
were not hesitating to admit the evidence, Van de Kamp 
suddenly announced full-fledged endorsement of the 
procedure, preparing legislation to establish five regional 
DNA testing labs and to provide for a databank of DNA 
profiles of convicted sex criminals, thereby moving California 
from last to near first in the great race to admit this new 
crime-fighting technology.  
(citing William Vogeler, Van de Kamp to Push for DNA Testing, DAILY J., Jan. 
25, 1989, at 1 col. 2). 
 75. See id. at 477 n.58 (describing DNA propaganda from the late 1980s 
that claimed the technology was so “precise” that “[i]f you’re a criminal, it’s like 
leaving your name, address, and social security number at the scene of the 
crime” and “[t]o see justice served, ifs, buts, or maybes aren’t enough. Get the 
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struggled to deal with the new evidence due to its complex 
scientific nature.76  
In 1989, however, members of the scientific community went 
on record as not necessarily having reached a general consensus 
about the admissibility of DNA evidence. In People v. Castro,77 
the Superior Court of Bronx County, New York, conducted a 
twelve-week “exhaustive evaluation of both the DNA procedure 
and the application of traditional admissibility rules.”78 Castro 
involved the murder of a twenty-year-old pregnant woman and 
her two-year-old daughter in Bronx, New York.79 The police had 
few leads until they arrested Joseph Castro and found dried blood 
on his watch.80 Prosecutors sent the sample from the watch, the 
victim’s blood, and the suspect’s blood to a private laboratory 
named Lifecodes. Lifecodes reported a match between the blood 
on the watch and the victim’s blood.81 The prosecution sought to 
introduce the DNA results as evidence.82 Mr. Castro sought to 
exclude the DNA typing evidence.83 Defense experts uncovered 
serious errors in Lifecodes’s tests.84 In fact, the prosecution’s 
                                                                                                     
definitive answer [with DNA]”). 
 76. See id. at 477 n.59 (quoting one defense attorney as stating “there has 
been little, if any, informed cross examination of private DNA vendors and few 
qualified expert witnesses testifying in opposition. The defense lawyers in these 
cases, often court appointed counsel, have been overwhelmed”). 
 77. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989), abrogated by People v. Wesley, 589 
N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).  
 78. Stephen M. Patton, DNA Fingerprinting: The Castro Case, 3 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 223, 223 (1990). 
 79. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (“The defendant stands accused of two 
counts of murder in the second degree, it being alleged that on February 5, 1987 
he stabbed to death twenty-year-old Vilma Ponce, who was seven months 
pregnant at the time, and her two-year-old daughter.”). 
 80. See id. (“A wrist watch worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest 
was seized. What appeared to be bloodstains on the watch were noted by the 
detectives. The defendant stated that the blood was his own.”). 
 81. See id. at 998 (“Lifecodes declares a match by visual observation in a 
blind reading of the autoradiograph.”). 
 82. See id. at 985–86 (“The People, intending to prove at trial that the 
origin of the bloodstains on defendant’s wristwatch was the blood of the adult 
victim, and not the blood of the defendant, seek to introduce evidence of DNA 
identification tests.”). 
 83. See id. at 988 (listing the expert witnesses testifying for the defense).  
 84. See id. at 996 (“In a piercing attack upon each molecule of evidence 
presented, the defense was successful in demonstrating to this court that the 
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main expert witness recanted his testimony, and the defense and 
prosecution experts issued a joint statement that “[t]he DNA data 
in this case are not scientifically reliable enough to support the 
assertion that the samples . . . do or do not match. If these data 
were submitted to a peer-reviewed journal in support of a 
conclusion, they would not be accepted. Further experimentation 
would be required.”85 Before ruling this particular DNA evidence 
inadmissible, the court made a general finding that under the 
Frye admissibility standard, “DNA forensic identification tests” 
are generally acceptable for both inculpatory and exculpatory 
purposes.86 The court, however, rendered this particular evidence 
inadmissible because the testing laboratory had not followed 
“scientifically accepted tests.”87 
The court reached its finding after recognizing the difficulty 
of applying the Frye test to such complex scientific evidence. In 
an attempt to refine Frye to accommodate complicated DNA 
evidence, the court issued a three-part test for the admissibility of 
DNA: 
Prong I. Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the 
scientific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA 
forensic testing can produce reliable results? 
Prong II. Are there techniques or experiments that currently 
exist that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA 
identification and which are generally accepted in the 
scientific community? 
                                                                                                     
testing laboratory failed in its responsibility to perform the accepted scientific 
techniques and experiments in several major respects.”); Patton, supra note 78, 
at 229–30 (discussing the unreliable tests performed by Lifecodes). Many issues 
that arise with DNA fingerprinting stem from a low quality sample. See id. at 
229 n.27 (discussing difficulties that arise with DNA fingerprinting due to the 
lack of control over the sample). 
 85. See Hoeffel, supra note 72, at 478. 
 86. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (“This court 
concludes that the credible scientific evidence in this case supports the 
conclusion that DNA forensic identification evidence meets the Frye 
standard. . . . Therefore, it is the conclusion of this court that DNA forensic 
identification tests to determine inclusions are reliable and meet the Frye 
standard of admissibility.”). 
 87. See id. at 997–98 (“Accordingly, the credible testimony having clearly 
established that the testing laboratory failed to conduct the necessary and 
scientifically accepted tests, the evidence demonstrating an inclusion is 
inadmissible as a matter of law.”). 
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Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted 
scientific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this 
particular case?88 
In Prong I, the court reviewed the theory of DNA analysis in 
general and explained that the scientific community is in 
agreement that “DNA forensic testing can produce reliable 
results.”89 In Prong II, the court reviewed the current DNA 
“techniques and experiments” to assess whether those techniques 
are “capable of producing reliable results in DNA identification 
and which are generally accepted in the scientific community.”90 
The court noted that all of the procedures used had “gained 
general scientific acceptance;” however, the “transfer of this 
[generally accepted] technology to DNA forensic 
identification . . . generated much . . . dispute.”91 In other words, 
the court did not focus solely on the historically accepted 
techniques and instead conducted a thorough admissibility 
analysis because of the new nature of the technology. The court 
ultimately relied on the “credible scientific evidence” surrounding 
these techniques and experiments and concluded “that DNA 
forensic identification evidence meets the Frye standard.”92 
Pursuant to Frye, the court deferred to the scientists who the 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. at 987. 
 89. Id. at 988. 
 90. Id. at 989. The techniques specifically in question were the restriction 
fragment length polymorphism method of DNA typing. These techniques, as the 
court defined them, included:  
(1) digestion of DNA into fragments by restriction enzymes creating RFLPs; (2) 
separation of the DNA fragments by electrophoresis; (3) staining the separate 
fragments with ethidium bromide so that they can be illuminated by ultraviolet 
exposure; (4) denaturing, or separating the two DNA strands, and fixing them to 
a nylon membrane; (5) hybridization of the single strand of DNA by marking it 
at a specific location with a radioactive probe; and (6) reproducing a picture of 
the radioactively marked DNA onto an x-ray film—or autoradiograph or 
autorad; (7) Interpretation of Autorads; and (8) Population Genetics, if 
necessary.  
Id. at 989–93. In addition, the court took up “additional experiments, 
techniques, and controls” including (1) mixing experiment; (2) serial dilution; (3) 
non-polymorphic probe; (4) synthetic probes; (5) male and female DNA in control 
lane when examining sex chromosomes; and (6) the matching rule. See id. at 
993–95 (discussing each of these additional experiments in turn).  
 91. Id. at 990. 
 92. Id. at 995.  
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court recognized “will be in a position to generate reliable 
results.”93  
Finally, in Prong III, the court examined the reliability of the 
specific tests performed by Lifecodes. The court found that 
Lifecodes failed to perform specific experiments and techniques, 
and therefore did not follow the accepted scientific procedures.94 
Ultimately, the court accepted DNA fingerprinting as admissible 
scientific evidence, but excluded Lifecodes’s specific DNA 
fingerprinting analysis of Mr. Castro.95 
The court’s thorough analysis in Castro, particularly the 
analysis in Prong III, played a significant role in shaping how 
courts applied the Frye standard to DNA evidence.96 After Castro, 
several courts more closely examined their scientific evidentiary 
standard with regards to DNA evidence.97 At a minimum, Castro 
and its aftermath created a dialogue between attorneys, experts, 
and courts about the proper standard for the admissibility of 
DNA evidence.98 Faced with a new and complicated technology, 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 996–98 (describing the specific procedures that Lifecodes 
failed to complete). 
 95. See id. at 995, 997–98 (concluding first that “DNA forensic 
identification tests to determine exclusion are reliable and meet the Frye 
standard of admissibility” but later deeming the DNA identification evidence 
inadmissible as a matter of law). 
 96. See e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794–96 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(discussing Castro and Two Bulls and applying a more liberal standard to DNA 
evidence); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) (adopting 
Castro’s Prong III analysis and justifying the addition to the Frye test because of 
the novelty of DNA evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendant); State 
v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 854 (N.C. 1990) (discussing Castro and 
upholding the admission of forensic DNA technology under a modified Frye 
standard similar to that used in Castro); Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 392–99 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (discussing Maryland’s DNA admissibility procedure); 
People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 860–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing 
Castro and upholding the admission of forensic DNA technology under a 
modified Frye standard similar to that used in Castro); State v. Pennell, 584 
A.2d 513, 516–20 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (same).  
 97. See supra note 96 (listing cases in several jurisdictions that treated 
DNA evidence differently post-Castro). 
 98. See R. Michael Sweeney, Comment, DNA Typing: Defending a Process 
Under Vigorous Attack, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 611, 629–30 (1992) (discussing Castro 
and its aftermath and noting that several jurisdictions began using a modified 
Frye standard and held Frye hearings to determine the admissibility of novel 
DNA techniques). 
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the court created an arguably more stringent standard than the 
Frye test. The Castro test required both Frye’s general acceptance 
throughout the scientific community as well as an additional 
analysis by the court to ensure the specific techniques used with 
DNA evidence independently met the Frye standard.99 
Specifically, in Prong III, the court suggested judges conduct pre-
trial hearings to consider whether “the testing laboratory in the 
particular case yielded results sufficiently reliable to be presented 
to the jury.”100 Others have argued, however, that this Prong III 
analysis “relates more to the weight of the evidence than to 
traditional concerns over admissibility” because reliability of 
evidence is a concept typically within the province of the jury.101 
Three years later in People v. Wesley,102 a New York court 
declined to follow Castro stating, “the theory underlying forensic 
DNA fingerprinting has gained acceptance in the scientific 
community. . . . [T]his conclusion is no longer subject to much 
dispute.”103 Wesley specifically dismissed the idea of imposing 
additional or “more stringent” requirements for novel and 
complex peculiarities attendant to DNA testing.104 Wesley’s 
ultimate dismissal of the Castro reasoning does not undermine 
the fact that initially, faced with a new technology, some courts 
treated complex scientific evidence differently. As DNA 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Patton, supra note 78, at 230 (discussing the Prong III 
requirement). 
 100. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 998 (Sup. Ct. 1989).  
 101. Patton, supra note 78, at 230. 
 102. 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 103. Id. at 200. 
 104. See id. at 199 n.2 
We are aware that several tribunals which follow the Frye standard 
for admissibility of novel scientific evidence . . . have declined to adopt 
it in the context of DNA fingerprint evidence, claiming that the 
relative novelty of the theory and the complexity of the testing 
procedures require a more stringent test which includes, in addition 
to satisfying the Frye test, a showing that accepted procedures 
actually were followed in testing the subject samples, thus rendering 
the results reliable. While cognizant of the fact that the Frye test 
recently has been called into question as an across-the-board 
standard for judging the admissibility of all types of scientific 
evidence in this instance we are not persuaded that the peculiarities 
attendant to DNA testing render the Frye test inadequate. 
(citations omitted). 
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technology continues to change, courts should continue to 
carefully analyze and assess the reliability and admissibility of 
the new and complex DNA technologies.  
2. Post-Daubert Admissibility of DNA Evidence 
Starting in the mid-1990s, courts began admitting DNA 
identification evidence based on restriction fragment length 
polymorphism (RFLP) and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
typing, methods courts still widely accept today.105 In conjunction 
with admitting the RFLP and PCR typing, courts today typically 
admit the statistical calculations that aid in deciphering the 
typing results. Without the statistics providing the probability 
assessment, the jury has no way of understanding the matching 
profiles.106 Persuasive statistics usually carry an immense weight 
                                                                                                     
 105. See United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444–48 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(applying the Daubert standard and concluding “that the reliability of the PCR 
method of DNA analysis is sufficiently well established to permit the courts of 
this circuit to take judicial notice of it in future cases”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1246, 1246 (1997); United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1072–75 (10th Cir. 
1994) (applying the Daubert standard and concluding the trial court properly 
determined the methodology for DNA testing and properly applied that 
methodology to the facts in issue), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1029, 1029 (1995); 
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 549–68 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing in detail 
the proper admissibility analysis for DNA evidence and concluding that the 
DNA evidence “easily meets the more liberal test set out by the Supreme Court 
in Daubert”); United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 345–46 (D. N.H. 1997) 
(denying defendant’s motion to exclude DNA evidence and finding PCR method 
of DNA testing reliable and admissible under the Daubert standard), aff’d, 159 
F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1077, 1077 (1999); United 
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 255, 263 (D. Vt. 1990) (acknowledging that 
“most all of the state trial and appellate courts that have confronted the issue 
have held that DNA profiling is generally admissible” and holding that DNA 
profiling is admissible to prove identity), aff’d, 955 F.2d 786, 807 (2d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 834, 834 (1992).  
 106. See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991) 
(“[W]ithout the probability assessment, the jury does not know what to make of 
the fact that the patterns match: the jury does not know whether the patterns 
are as common as pictures with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa.”); 
Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 13 (“Courts 
in most jurisdictions will not admit DNA evidence unless it is accompanied by 
statistics to give meaning to the finding of a match.”). 
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with a jury.107 The certainty of the statistics may affect the court’s 
admissibility analysis.108 
Over the past twenty years, courts have continued to identify 
substantive factors affecting DNA’s admissibility. For example, 
similar to the issue in Castro, laboratories must use certain 
standards and procedures during testing.109 If the laboratory does 
not comply with these specific standards, the results may be 
inaccurate, and the sample may be inadmissible.110 As a 
procedural matter, a court continues to require the prosecution to 
prove both the general acceptance of the DNA technology as well 
as its reliability.111 This requirement usually boils down to a 
battle of the experts.112 The prosecution may need to subpoena 
multiple experts, including the laboratory technician who 
conducted the test.113 Courts widely accept, as scientifically 
reliable, the underlying RFLP and PCR methods. Therefore, 
defense attorneys typically challenge the evidence in other ways 
such as any purported bias of the prosecution’s witnesses, 
inaccurate standards or procedures, a laboratory’s poor 
performance, or the liberality of match criteria applied in the 
particular case.114  
                                                                                                     
 107. See Martinez v. Florida, 549 So. 2d 694, 694–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (acknowledging the impact of DNA and acknowledging other courts 
exclude statistical DNA evidence involving very large numbers due to their 
potentially exaggerated effect on the jury). 
 108. See id. (analyzing the exaggerated effect of DNA statistical evidence on 
the jury but ultimately concluding the average jury can weigh the credibility of 
such figures when they are properly presented and challenged, and that 
statistical evidence is acceptable if it has an adequate scientific and factual 
basis). 
 109. See United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 414–16 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(discussing laboratory standards in the forensic community). 
 110. See id. at 419 (noting that failure to meet laboratory standards––
particularly contamination––could affect the reliability of the results obtained).  
 111. Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification Tests 
and the Court, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 939–45 (1988).  
 112. See id. (discussing expert testimony). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 941, 943 n.202 (discussing defense experts and their 
arguments). 
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III. Understanding DNA as Scientific Evidence 
A basic understanding of DNA, DNA typing methods, and 
human and computer statistical interpretation methods is needed 
in order to understand an admissibility analysis of DNA evidence 
interpreted by TrueAllele. Part III discusses the scientific 
development of these DNA techniques and compares and 
contrasts the widely used human interpretation DNA analysis 
with the new TrueAllele technology. 
A. The Basic Principles of DNA 
DNA and its technology is complicated. Most judges, lawyers, 
and jurors do not have the scientific background required to fully 
understand forensic science.115 Despite this lack of understanding 
in the courtroom, DNA is nevertheless considered a “powerful 
evidentiary tool[,] and its importance in the courtroom cannot be 
overstated.”116  
To understand the different methods of DNA identification 
techniques and their interpretation, it is helpful to first grasp 
some basic principles and terms.117 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
molecules are long threadlike structures resembling a twisted 
“ladder.”118 DNA is located in the chromosomes, which are in the 
nucleus of a cell.119 The sides of the ladder are composed of a 
chain of sugars and phosphates.120 The “rungs” or “teeth” 
attached to the ladder consist of pairs of molecules called 
“bases.”121 The bases include adenine, cytosine, guanine, and 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 52–54 (discussing 
the challenges and complexity of DNA typing). 
 116. See Whack v. State, 433 Md. 728, 732 (2013) (citing Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013), which observed that DNA technology is “one of the 
most significant scientific advancements of our era” and its usefulness in the 
criminal justice system is “undisputed”).  
 117. For a more detailed description of the DNA paradigm, see JAMES D. 
WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (7th ed., 2013). For a lawyer-
friendly basic introduction to DNA, see LARRY GONICK & MARK WHEELIS, THE 
CARTOON GUIDE TO GENETICS (1991). 
 118. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 62. 
 119. Id. at 61 n.76. 
 120. Id. at 62. 
 121. Id. 
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thymine (A, C, G, and T, respectively).122 Each base bonds with 
one other base to make up the rung. The order of the bases along 
the DNA molecule creates an organism’s genetic code.123  
DNA analysis unravels the genetic alphabet from a 
chromosome’s hundred million letters and zooms in to a small 
region of approximately 100 to 500 letters.124 Most sections of the 
chain of bases are the same among individuals within a given 
species, but certain sections are unique (also known as variable 
or “polymorphic”).125 Zooming in on these unique sections 
provides highly variable data useful for identifying people.126 In 
addition, sometimes a “gene” (a sequence of bases responsible for 
producing a particular protein) will produce two or more possible 
variations called “alleles.”127 These variations cause different 
physical expressions of the gene. For example, the human gene 
responsible for the production of blood is polymorphic and 
produces different alleles, resulting in a number of different blood 
types in the human population.128 
Due to these unique polymorphisms, no two individuals 
(except for identical twins) have identical base sequences 
throughout their DNA.129 At the same time, no person’s base 
sequence within a particular section is absolutely unique 
compared to the rest of the population.130 A person’s DNA 
remains the same throughout life131 and can be tested using a 
variety of biological materials.132 DNA identification of a specific 
                                                                                                     
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Mark Perlin, When Good DNA Goes Bad, J. FORENSIC RES., Apr. 
2013, at 1 [hereinafter Perlin, When Good DNA Goes Bad] (describing the 
genotype).  
 125. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 62. 
 126. See Perlin, When Good DNA Goes Bad, supra note 124, at 1 (“This 
genetic location, or ‘locus,’ could describe meaningful information like a 
functional gene, or, alternatively, its DNA letters could code for something more 
random.”). 
 127. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 62. 
 128. See id. at 51 (discussing ABO typing, a genetic identification technique, 
and its limitations). 
 129. Id. at 61. 
 130. Id. at 63. 
 131. Id. at 61. 
 132. See Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of 
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person, therefore, is not perfect and typically operates only to a 
practical exclusion of others.133 
B. Genetic Identification: Methods of DNA Typing 
After collecting a DNA sample, a laboratory technician 
engages in the process of isolating and producing a DNA result 
for interpretation.134 This process is typically called “DNA 
fingerprinting.”135 Two methods of DNA fingerprinting emerged 
in the mid-1980s. The first method is called restriction fragment 
length polymorphism analysis.136 The second technique of DNA 
fingerprinting is called polymerase chain reaction.137  
Both the PCR and RFLP processes are vulnerable to 
producing “artifacts.”138 Artifacts are inaccurate or invalid results 
that can be caused by contamination or laboratory failures.139 For 
example, RFLP analysis may suffer from “band shifts,” an 
unexplained phenomenon in which DNA fragments in one lane of 
a gel migrate at a rate different from identical fragments in other 
lanes of the same gel.140 Band shifts have the effect of producing 
inaccurate results that may incorrectly implicate a defendant.141 
Similarly, PCR analysis may suffer from “shadow peaks.”142 
                                                                                                     
DNA, 75 WIS. LAW 20, 23 (2002) (discussing the biological materials that house 
DNA including hair follicles, blood, semen, and other tissues).  
 133. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing 
statistical issues of matching DNA type in the population and the probability of 
a coincidental match between two unrelated individuals). 
 134. See Sue Rosenthal, Note, My Brother’s Keeper: A Challenge to the 
Probative Value of DNA Fingerprinting, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 195, 198 (1995) 
(discussing the initial extraction and analysis of DNA). 
 135. See id. at 199 (introducing the concept of a DNA “fingerprint”).  
 136. See George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA 
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2468 (1997) 
(introducing the RFLP technique). 
 137. See id. at 2470 (introducing the PCR technique). 
 138. See id. at 2471 (discussing the disadvantages to PCR and RFLP 
analysis). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Judith A. McKenna, Joe S. Cecil & Pamela Coukos, Reference Guide 
on Forensic DNA Evidence, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, at 295–96, 
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sciam.9.dna.pdf (defining band shifting). 
 141. Id. at 296. 
 142. See Smith & Gordon, supra note 136, at 2471 (discussing how PCR 
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Shadow peaks are allelic peaks, usually with a low number of 
relative fluorescent units that do not actually exist in a DNA 
profile but appear as an inaccurate result of the PCR 
amplification.143 Although (quantitative) human interpretation of 
DNA typically accounts for shadow peaks, a (qualitative) 
computerized interpretation of DNA may not.144 In addition, 
when experts attempt to produce a DNA fingerprint from samples 
that contain too little DNA or DNA that is too degraded, the 
results of the DNA test can be unreliable, even when using PCR 
analysis.145 Degraded samples may cause the analysis to fail to 
detect certain genetic characteristics; a phenomenon called 
“allelic dropout” may result in similar inaccurate consequences.146  
C. Human Interpretation of DNA Profiles 
Once a laboratory obtains a DNA fingerprint from the sample 
provided, the prosecution will provide the laboratory with a DNA 
fingerprint from the defendant. A technician must then 
demonstrate that the results from the sample match and identify 
that particular defendant.147 The expert makes this identification 
                                                                                                     
methodology is susceptible to error and can lead to amplification of the wrong 
DNA).  
 143. Id. 
 144. Infra Part III.C–D. 
 145. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
12 (discussing unreliable DNA results). 
 146. Allelic “dropout” occurs when an allele is present at a locus but not 
detected due to “background noise.” See id. at 14 (discussing stochastic effects). 
Allelic dropout may be caused by using samples that contain too little DNA, 
frequently referred to as low-copy number samples because these samples 
contain a low number of copies of the targeted DNA. Id. Basically, when the 
DNA collected is degraded or mixed, the PCR test can distort the result. Id. The 
test might drop alleles entirely or pick up extra alleles that should not be there 
(where the dropping phenomenon is called “stutter” and the peaks are referred 
to as “shadow peaks”). Id. The more distorted the test results, the less accurate 
the interpretation of those results. In other words, inaccurate duplication of 
DNA may yield false positives that can give the impression of enhanced 
probability. For more information on LCN typing, see BRUCE BUDOWLE ET AL., 
LAB. DIV. OF THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LOW COPY NUMBER: 
CONSIDERATION AND CAUTION, LAB. DIV. OF THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
(2001), http://www.promega.com/~/media/files/resources/conference%20proceed 
ings/ishi%2012/oral%20presentations/budowle.pdf?la=en.  
 147. See Lawyer’s Guide to Forensic Statistics: Technical Bulletin 40-021, at 
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through statistical assumptions.148 The statistics give meaning to 
the finding of a DNA “match.”149  
Laboratories that conduct human analysis of DNA mixture 
samples follow an all-or-nothing approach.150 If an allelic peak 
falls above a certain threshold, it will be counted as present; if it 
falls below that threshold, it will be counted as absent.151 
Analysts measure the peak heights and the thresholds in relative 
fluorescent units.152 The manual method does not permit an 
analyst to conclude a probability of a match at a particular allele 
as anything other than 100% or 0%.153 If the peak reaches the 
line, then the peak counts as part of the analysis, and the 
analysis ends. Due to the low relative fluorescent units of 
“shadow peaks,” human analysis generally excludes these 
artifacts.154 In order to cast a wider net, analysts employ different 
standards to determine the threshold. Sometimes, analysts 
declare an allelic peak a match if the peak rises above 120 
relative fluorescent units, and sometimes the cut off is 80 relative 
                                                                                                     
1 (Chromosomal Laboratories, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona) http://schooldays 
360.wikispaces.com/file/view/LawyerGuidetoForensicStatistics.pdf [hereinafter 
Technical Bulletin 40-021] (giving an overview of DNA statistics); ROBERTO 
PUCH-SOLIS ET AL., PRACTITIONER GUIDE NO. 2: ASSESSING THE PROBATIVE VALUE 
OF DNA EVIDENCE: GUIDANCE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, FORENSIC SCIENTISTS, AND 
EXPERT WITNESSES 1–5, 13–14, http://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~cgga/Guide-2-
WEB.pdf (same). 
 148. See Technical Bulletin 40-021, supra note 147, at 1 (discussing the 
requirement of demonstrating that the DNA characteristics are variable among 
populations). 
 149. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991).  
 150. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
17 (“A more defensible way to deal with problems arising from stochastic effects 
is for the lab to ignore for statistical purposes any locus where it is suspected 
that stochastic effects (leading to dropout) may have occurred, whether or not 
the suspect ‘matches’ at that locus.”). 
 151. See id. (“As a general policy, some labs ignore for statistical purposes 
any result from a locus where there are peaks below a ‘stochastic threshold,’ 
which is often set somewhere between 50 and 150 RFU.”).  
 152. See id. (“Peak heights are measured in ‘relative fluorescent units’ 
(RFU) and their height can be determined by reference to the vertical indices on 
an electropherogram.”). 
 153. See Mark Perlin, DNA Done Right, FHC Experts for Law 5:4-7 (Experts 
Forum, Essex, UK), 2013, at 5 (describing the incorporation of the Bayes rule 
into assessing peak height patterns) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 154. See supra notes 138–146 and accompanying text (discussing artifacts). 
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fluorescent units. Employing different thresholds may yield 
different results.155 Ultimately, forensic science labs 
commissioned studies to establish and validate stochastic and 
analytical thresholds in order to eliminate this subjectivity.156 At 
the same time, the field also sought ways to improve statistical 
calculations in mixture cases by utilizing computer analysis and 
incorporating the Likelihood Ratio approach.157  
Different DNA profiles require different statistical 
treatment.158 For example, DNA mixture profiles (DNA samples 
that include more than one contributor)159 create unique 
analytical and statistical challenges.160 In 2006, the International 
Society of Forensic Genetics issued a consensus document “to 
define a generally acceptable mathematical approach for typical 
mixture scenarios and to address open questions where practical 
and generally accepted solutions do not yet exist.”161  
                                                                                                     
 155. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
17 (discussing stochastic thresholds and admitting “’stochastic thresholds’ are 
not a perfect solution . . . to unreliable DNA because . . . experts disagree about 
what the ‘stochastic threshold’ should be”).  
 156. See Erin Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson’s Guide 
to the Subjectivity Inherent in Forensic DNA Typing, 58 EMORY L.J. 489, 503–04 
(2008) (describing the importance of peak-height thresholds). 
 157. See Gill, ISFG Recommendations, supra note 161, at 90–101 (proposing 
a statistical method that takes dropout probabilities into account). 
 158. See Technical Bulletin 40-021, supra note 147, at 1 (discussing valid 
statistical treatments applied appropriately in different situations). 
 159. See Peter M. Schneider et al., Editorial on the Recommendations of the 
DNA Commission of the ISFG on the Interpretation of Mixtures, 160 FORENSIC 
SCI. INT’L 89, 89 (2006) (discussing DNA mixture profiles); Mark W. Perlin, 
Explaining the Likelihood Ratio in DNA Mixture Interpretation 7–8 (Dec. 29, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Perlin, Explaining LR] (discussing 
and defining DNA mixtures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. See Schneider et al., supra note 159, at 89 (“The biostatistical 
interpretation of . . . mixed DNA profiles is a very challenging task that 
sometimes leads to controversial views about correct mathematical approaches 
for estimating the weight of the evidence.”). 
 161. Peter Gill et al., DNA Commission of the International Society of 
Forensic Genetics: Recommendations on the Interpretation of Mixtures, 160 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 90, 90 (2006) [hereinafter Gill, ISFG Recommendations]. 
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D. Computer Interpretation of DNA Profiles: TrueAllele 
In 1994, a private company called Cybergenetics began 
commercializing a computerized DNA interpretation technology 
called TrueAllele.162 TrueAllele debuted in the United States in 
2002.163 The New York State Police published two National DNA 
Index System validation studies and ultimately incorporated 
TrueAllele into its Department of Forensic Science.164 In 2006, 
Cybergenetics received a contract to reanalyze and reinterpret 
the DNA of victims’ remains from the September 11, 2001 World 
Trade Center terrorist attack.165 In 2009, TrueAllele made its 
first appearance in a United States courtroom in the murder case 
of Commonwealth v. Foley.166  
Cybergenetics markets TrueAllele as an automated system 
for interpreting DNA evidence.167 Computer analysis like 
TrueAllele is not a substitute for the DNA collection or 
amplification process. Instead, the process remains the same 
until the point of the DNA statistical analysis. In other words, 
law enforcement still collects the sample, submits it to the 
Department of Forensic Science laboratory, and the lab uses 
traditional amplification processes to produce data suitable for 
                                                                                                     
 162. See History of Cybergenetics, CYBERGENETICS, 
http://www.cybgen.com/company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) 
(describing the history of Cybergenetics and TrueAllele) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; see also New York State Police to Deploy FBI Approved TrueAllele 
Expert System for DNA Review, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 28, 2006), 
http://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2006/New-York-State-Police-
to-Deploy-FBI-Approved-TrueAllele-Expert-System-for-DNA-Review/page.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing New York State Police acceptance of 
TrueAllele) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 165. History of Cybergenetics, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/ 
company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 166. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(discussing the admissibility of TrueAllele as a novel scientific method that Mr. 
Foley claimed “ha[d] never been used in court”); infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing 
Commonwealth v. Foley). 
 167. History of Cybergenetics, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/ 
company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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statistical interpretation.168 At that point, however, the 
laboratory forwards the sample to Cybergenetics, and 
Cybergenetics conducts the interpretation.169 Alternatively, some 
forensic labs may have TrueAllele software on-site, and will 
conduct their own analysis.170 Instead of traditional human 
analysis where a person manually examines the allelic peaks, the 
TrueAllele operator inputs the DNA fingerprint into the 
computer program. The program, in turn, subjects that data to a 
computer analysis.  
The developer of TrueAllele, Dr. Mark Perlin, aimed to create 
an analysis technology that could “easily analyze and interpret 
DNA data rapidly and cost effectively, while reducing human 
error.”171 More recently, Dr. Perlin has focused on adapting 
TrueAllele to analyze and interpret mixed DNA samples with 
multiple contributors.172  
The TrueAllele computer program relies on a form of 
statistical analysis called probabilistic genotyping.173 
Probabilistic genotyping involves applying the information 
derived from DNA profiles to complex mathematical formulas 
known as algorithms.174 The algorithms compare different 
statistical models to the actual data and weigh the probability 
that the model matches the data.175 Using that probability, 
                                                                                                     
 168. See id. (describing TrueAllele as an “interpretation” method, and not a 
DNA typing technology). 
 169. See Sending Data, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/support/ 
sending_data.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing TrueAllele’s protocol 
for sending and processing laboratory’s data) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 170. See JO ANN GIVEN ET AL., FORENSIC SCIENCE BASED ANNUAL REPORT 4 
(2013) (giving an example of one state that acquired the TrueAllele software in 
their own laboratories in order to generate their own calculations). 
 171. History of Cybergenetics, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/ 
company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 172. See id. (“Working with some of the foremost laboratories in forensics, 
Cybergenetics began to develop technology that could analyze and interpret 
complex mixed crimes scene DNA in a matter of minutes.”). 
 173. Perlin, When Good DNA Goes Bad, supra note 124, at 3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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technicians can further compute a likelihood ratio using 
traditional statistical methods.176 
Specifically, TrueAllele relies on a class of algorithms derived 
from a Bayesian statistical analysis called Monte Carlo-Markov 
Chain (MCMC) modeling.177 The MCMC statistical approach has 
been used in a variety of situations to successfully model many 
complex data sets;178 however, MCMC’s application to forensic 
DNA is arguably new and unique to TrueAllele.179  
IV. The Admissibility of TrueAllele 
A. TrueAllele Precedent 
The differences between traditional DNA interpretation and 
computerized DNA interpretation prompted some courts to 
examine the admissibility of the new technology. Although Frye 
and Daubert lay out clear standards for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence, applying these standards to new technologies 
is not always easy.180 As of right now, only a few cases involve the 
admissibility of TrueAllele,181 and courts are still in the process of 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. (“The computer records an evidence genotype as a probability 
distribution. Afterwards, the computer can then make an objective comparison 
to a known reference genotype obtained from a suspect or some other person.”). 
 177. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
18 (introducing MCMC statistical modeling). 
 178. See id. (“The [TrueAllele] system relies on [MCMC] that has been 
widely used in the field of statistics to model complex situations.”). 
 179. See id. (“Although the application of this technique to forensic DNA 
testing is novel, the underlying approach has been used successfully 
elsewhere.”). Dr. Perlin previously testified that his system relies on 
mathematical principles that have been accepted “for 200 years.” See Transcript 
of Record, Regina v. Colin Duffy & Brian Shivers, [2011] NICC (Crim) 37, [103] 
[hereinafter Duffy & Shivers Transcript] (describing the underlying principles of 
TrueAllele as “hav[ing] been in place for at least 200 years”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Others, however, claim that the use of 
MCMC in forensic applications was first attempted within the last ten to fifteen 
years. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 18 
(discussing the novelty of the MCMC approach in forensic applications). 
 180. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (noting the Ninth 
Circuit’s frustration when the court had to apply the Daubert factors to the new 
DNA technology on remand). 
 181. As this Note was going to print, the Supreme Court of the State of New 
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creating the body of precedent that will govern the admissibility 
of evidence analyzed by the new technology.  
1. Regina v. Colin Duffy & Brian Shivers 
In December 2011, a court in Northern Ireland convicted 
defendant Brian Shivers of murder in connection with an attack 
on British soldiers at Massereene Barracks on March 7, 2009.182 
The judge acquitted Mr. Shivers’s co-defendant, Colin Duffy, of 
the same charge.183 The police allegedly found Mr. Shivers’s DNA 
in two locations on the interior of the backseat of the getaway 
car.184 The police also allegedly found Mr. Duffy’s DNA on a latex 
glove tip inside the same car and on the seat buckle, but the 
                                                                                                     
York for the County of Schenectady, New York released a decision and order 
finding that “Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework is not novel but instead is 
‘generally accepted’ under the Frye standard.” Decision and Order at 13, New 
York v. Wakefield, No. A-812-29 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.cybgen.com/ 
information/admissibility/Wakefield2015.pdf. Accordingly, that court denied the 
defendant’s motion to preclude DNA evidence interpreted by TrueAllele. Id. In 
addition, the court also specifically found: 
(1) that Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework has been empirically 
tested and found to be relevant, reliable, and accurate,  
(2) that Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework has been subjected to 
favorable peer review and extensive publication,  
(3) that Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework’s average efficacy has 
been proved to be at least 4 ½ orders of magnitude more efficacious 
than human review on the same data,  
(4) that Cybergenetics TrueAllele Casework has been validated and 
found to be reproducible,  
(5) that the various scientific principles used by Cybergenetics 
TrueAllele Casework have been long ago accepted and endorsed by 
the scientific community, and  
(6) that the on-going administrative investigation at the New York 
State Police Forensic Investigation Center has no bearing on the 
validation studies performed in July 2013 and/or March 2014 . . . . 
Id. at 12–13. Due to the timing of publication, this Note does not analyze this 
opinion further. 
 182. See Brian Shivers Guilty of Massereene Soldiers’ Killing, BBC NEWS 
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
northern-ireland-16637380 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing the verdict) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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judge ultimately decided the prosecution failed to sufficiently link 
Mr. Duffy to the murder plot.185  
In Duffy, the prosecution used TrueAllele to analyze the DNA 
evidence after the traditional interpretation method produced 
inconclusive results.186 The admissibility argument over the 
TrueAllele technology culminated in a three-day voir dire 
examination of Dr. Perlin and a competing defense expert.187 
Ultimately, the judge admitted the DNA evidence as analyzed by 
TrueAllele.188 In that ruling, the judge dismissed several of the 
defense’s objections to the admissibility of the evidence including 
that Dr. Perlin has a “financial and professional interest in the 
outcome of the case”189 and that “Dr. Perlin negligently misled the 
court upon important aspects of his evidence.”190 Furthermore, 
the court engaged in a lengthy reliability analysis, crediting Dr. 
Perlin for giving “very detailed answers [about the TrueAllele 
technology] in a controlled and measured way.”191 The court 
noted, however, that it was “regrettable” that the TrueAllele 
technology had not been subject to greater peer review, although 
the court did not consider the lack of peer review dispositive for 
the admissibility analysis.192  
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. See Ruling on Voir Dire at 1, Regina v. Colin Duffy & Brian Shivers, 
[2011] NICC (Crim) 37 [hereinafter Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling], 
http://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2011/dec/Shivers2011.pdf 
(discussing another expert’s analysis under the widely accepted SGM+ method 
of DNA interpretation and how that software did not enable to expert to produce 
a result). 
 187. See generally Duffy & Shivers Transcript, supra note 179. 
 188. See Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 186, at 7.  
I am satisfied that the stage has now been reached in the case of this 
system where it can be regarded as being reliable and accepted, and I 
am satisfied that Dr. Perlin has given his evidence in a credible and 
reliable fashion. In the light of these conclusions I can see no basis on 
which I could properly exercise my discretion under Article 76 of The 
Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 to 
exclude this evidence, and I therefore admit it in evidence.  
 189. Id. at 3. 
 190. Id. at 4.  
 191. Id. at 8.  
 192. See id. at 11 (discussing TrueAllele’s lack of peer review). Please note 
the judge issued this ruling in 2011. TrueAllele may have undergone additional 
peer-review in the past four years. In fact, a more recent article notes that 
TrueAllele has “been used in over a hundred criminal cases with complex DNA 
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The court also debated the sufficiency of the method by which 
Dr. Perlin validated the TrueAllele technology—in other words, 
whether the “wider scientific community” had externally 
validated the TrueAllele process, as opposed to primarily internal 
validation.193 The court noted the parties had different ideas 
about the appropriate scope of the “relevant scientific 
community” that should provide the external validation.194 Dr. 
Perlin defined the relevant scientific community as “a small 
group of scholars working in the field of the probabilistic 
approach.”195 He noted that “[t]he community of scholars who 
develop DNA methods . . . is about 50 to 100 people, it was a lot 
smaller 10 to 15 years ago, and these are the groups of people 
who are responsible for ensuring that reliable methods do get out 
into the world.”196 The judge also noted that as of 2011, only a 
                                                                                                     
evidence. . . . [And] [s]even peer-reviewed scientific studies have demonstrated 
TrueAllele’s reliability.” TrueAllele Casework Ruled Admissible in Ohio Daubert 
Challenge, CYBERGENETICS, http://www.cybgen.com/information/press-
release/2014/TrueAllele-Casework-Ruled-Admissible-in-Ohio-Daubert-
Challenge/page.shtml (Oct. 22, 2014) (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). These studies include: 
(1) Mark Perlin & Alexander Sinelnikov, An Information Gap in DNA 
Evidence Interpretation, 4(12) PLOS ONE e8327 (Dec. 16, 2009);  
(2) Jack Ballantyne, Erin Hanson & Mark Perlin, DNA Mixture 
Genotyping by Probabilistic Computer Interpretation of Binomially-
Sampled Laser Captured Cell Populations: Combining Quantitative 
Data for Greater Identification Information, 53(2) SCI. & JUSTICE. 81, 
103–14 (2013);  
(3) Mark Perlin et al., TrueAllele Genotype Identification on DNA 
Mixtures Containing up to Five Unknown Contributors, J. FORENSIC 
SCIS. (forthcoming 2015);  
(4) Susan Greenspoon et al., Establishing the Limits of TrueAllele 
Casework: A Validation Study, J. FORENSIC SCIS. (forthcoming 2015);  
(5) Mark Perlin et al., Validating TrueAllele DNA Mixture 
Interpretation, 56(6) J. FORENSIC SCIS. 1407, 1430–47 (2011);  
(6) Mark Perlin et al., New York State TrueAllele Casework 
Validation Study, 58(6) J. FORENSIC SCIS. 1413, 1458–66 (2013); and  
(7) Mark Perlin et al., TrueAllele Casework on Virginia DNA Mixture 
Evidence: Computer and Manual Interpretation in 72 Reported 
Criminal Cases, 9(3) PLOS ONE e92837 (2014). 
 193. Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 186, at 11. 
 194. See id. (discussing the internal and external validation process of 
TrueAllele). 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 12.  
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“very small portion” of laboratories across the world had 
purchased and incorporated the TrueAllele technology.197 Despite 
these findings, however, the judge admitted the DNA evidence as 
interpreted by TrueAllele.198 The judge based this decision largely 
on the New York Commission on Forensic Science DNA Sub-
Committee’s recommendation that New York should adopt 
TrueAllele.199 
2. Commonwealth v. Foley 
One of the first cases in the United States to address the 
admissibility of TrueAllele was Commonwealth v. Foley.200 In that 
case, a jury convicted Kevin Foley of first-degree murder.201 Mr. 
Foley appealed on several issues, including “whether the trial 
court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Perlin, in violation 
of the Frye test for the admissibility of novel scientific 
testimony.”202 Pennsylvania and a minority of other states still 
adhere to the Frye test.203 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
defined the Frye test as a two-step process:  
First, the party opposing the evidence must show that the 
scientific evidence is “novel” by demonstrating “that there is a 
legitimate dispute regarding the reliability of the expert’s 
conclusions.” If the moving party has identified novel scientific 
evidence, then the proponent of the scientific evidence must 
show that “the expert’s methodology has general acceptance in 
                                                                                                     
 197. See id. at 14 (giving data about the number of laboratories using 
TrueAllele in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia).  
 198. See id. at 17 (“I am satisfied that the stage has now been reached in the 
case of this system where it can be regarded as being reliable and accepted, and 
I am satisfied that Dr. Perlin has given his evidence in a credible and reliable 
fashion.”). 
 199. See id. at 16–17 (discussing the Commission’s validation process).  
 200. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(finding the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Perlin’s testimony was not an 
abuse of discretion because “there is no reason to ‘impede admissibility of 
evidence that will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth’”). 
 201. Id. at 885. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that a minority of 
states use the Frye standard today); see also supra notes 26–37 and 
accompanying text (explaining the Frye test). 
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the relevant scientific community” despite the legitimate 
dispute.204 
The superior court acknowledged that the trial court did not 
expressly determine that Dr. Perlin’s testimony or TrueAllele 
technology was “novel scientific evidence.”205 Instead, the trial 
court held that Dr. Perlin’s new methodology was a refined 
application of the “product rule,” an old method of calculating 
probabilities.206 Consequently, because Pennsylvania previously 
admitted scientific evidence based on the product rule,207 the trial 
court admitted Dr. Perlin’s testimony and the TrueAllele 
methodology as generally accepted.208 In other words, the trial 
court did not conduct an independent Frye analysis for the 
TrueAllele technology. 
The superior court reviewed the trial court’s determination 
for abuse of discretion and found that Dr. Perlin’s testimony “was 
not ‘novel’ as that term is defined in the governing law, and thus 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
testimony.”209 The superior court explained that “[t]he ‘novelty’ of 
scientific testimony turns on whether ‘there is a legitimate 
dispute regarding the reliability of the expert’s conclusions,’ 
which is not necessarily related to the newness of the technology 
used in developing the conclusions.”210 In other words, under 
Frye, if the principle is disputed (even if it is a “bedrock” scientific 
principle), that principle should be subjected to a Frye analysis.211 
                                                                                                     
 204. Foley, 38 A.3d at 890 (citations omitted). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. For more on the “product rule,” see Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 
A.2d 1117, 1123–27 (Pa. 1998). 
 207. See Blasioli, 713 A.2d at 1127 (holding that statistical evidence based 
upon the product rule was properly admitted at the trial court level). 
 208. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(“Because Dr. Perlin’s calculations were made using newer technology, the trial 
court rhetorically asked ‘at what point does the use of the product rule become 
novel science.’ The trial court went on to find that Dr. Perlin’s methodology was 
generally accepted.” (citation omitted)). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. (“In Betz, the court noted that novelty ‘is not restricted to new 
science,’ and ‘even ‘bedrock’ scientific principles may be subject to a Frye 
analysis’ if those principles become disputed.” (citing Betz v. Pneumo Abex 
L.L.C., 998 A.2d 962, 973–74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010))).  
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TRUEALLELE 1067 
However, when there is no dispute, Frye should be “construed 
narrowly so as not to impede admissibility of evidence that will 
aid the trier of fact in search for truth.”212 Simply put, the 
superior court found no “legitimate dispute” regarding the 
reliability of Dr. Perlin’s testimony.213 
Mr. Foley raised, and the court discounted, three reasons for 
excluding Dr. Perlin’s testimony: 
(1) ‘as of the date of the pre-trial hearing, no forensic 
laboratory in the United States used Perlin’s TrueAllel [sic] 
method in analyzing a mixed sample of DNA for forensic 
purposes;’  
(2) ‘the TrueAllel [sic] system had never been used in a court of 
law in any jurisdiction in the United States on a mixed DNA 
sample to give a likelihood ratio;’ and  
(3) no outside scientists can replicate or validate Dr. Perlin’s 
methodology because his computer software is proprietary.214 
The court noted first that novelty alone does not “show ‘a 
legitimate dispute regarding the reliability of the expert’s 
conclusions’”215 and pointed out the extensive usage of Dr. Perlin’s 
method.216 The court similarly rejected Mr. Foley’s second 
argument “because ‘novelty’ of a scientific methodology does not 
turn on its previous use in court.”217 Finally, the court dismissed 
Mr. Foley’s third argument as “misleading” because “scientists 
can validate the reliability of a computerized process even if the 
‘source code’ underlying that process is not available to the 
public.”218 The court concluded that TrueAllele has been tested 
and validated in peer-review studies.219 
                                                                                                     
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 888–89. For more on the requirement to release the TrueAllele 
source code, see infra Part IV.A.3 & IV.B. 
 215. Id. at 889 (citing Betz, 998 A.2d at 972). 
 216. See id. (noting the use of TrueAllele technology by New York State, 
Allegheny County Crime Lab, the World Trade Center, and the United 
Kingdom’s Forensic Science Service).  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. (“Nevertheless, TrueAllele has been tested and validated in 
peer-reviewed studies.”). 
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3. Ohio v. Shaw 
A more recent case addressing the admissibility of TrueAllele 
in the United States is Ohio v. Shaw.220 Mr. Shaw was indicted 
for aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and 
kidnapping.221 The alleged incident occurred on June 6, 2012.222 
DNA evidence was collected at the crime scene from a doorknob 
and under the victim’s fingernails.223 Both the Cuyahoga County 
Medical Examiner’s Office and Sorenson Genomics, LLC tested 
the DNA evidence, and the evidence produced inconclusive 
results.224 The State then submitted the same DNA material to 
Cybergenetics for analysis using the TrueAllele technology.225 
TrueAllele produced conclusive results that the State sought to 
introduce at trial.226  
Mr. Shaw filed a motion in limine requesting the court 
exclude any and all evidence related to TrueAllele Casework 
System pursuant to Daubert.227 Mr. Shaw also filed a motion to 
compel TrueAllele’s source code.228 Mr. Shaw requested a pretrial 
hearing on these motions and the court held a hearing on June 
30, 2014.229 At that hearing, two experts––one of which was Dr. 
Perlin––testified on behalf of the state, and two experts testified 
on behalf of Mr. Shaw.230 On October 10, 2014, the Court of 
Common Pleas in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, issued an order 
discussing the admissibility of TrueAllele, and ultimately denying 
Mr. Shaw’s motions.231  
                                                                                                     
 220. Order, Ohio v. Shaw, CR-13-575691 (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2014/TrueAllele-Casework-
Ruled-Admissible-in-Ohio-Daubert-Challenge/admissibility.pdf. 
 221. Id. at 2. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1–2. 
 230. Id. at 2. 
 231. Id. at 25–26. 
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The testimony at the pretrial hearing primarily focused on 
two issues: first, whether TrueAllele has been subjected to 
validation and peer-review, and second, whether that validation 
is sufficient, given the inability of independent experts to validate 
the process due to the closed source code.232 With regards to the 
validation and peer-review, Dr. Perlin testified that TrueAllele 
has been validated and there are five published, peer-reviewed 
validation papers on the TrueAllele Casework System.233 These 
papers “go beyond an internal validation.”234 Dr. Perlin also 
testified that TrueAllele started in the State of New York and 
gained approval for forensic casework there.235 The defense 
expert, Dr. Ranajit Chakraborty, testified that he was a faculty 
member for the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis 
Methods (SWGDAM), which sets for guidelines for laboratories 
across the country.236 As a member of SWGDAM, Dr. 
Chakraborty testified that he approved TrueAllele for casework 
in New York State labs in 2011.237 That approval, however, only 
extended to TrueAllele testing a higher quantity of DNA from a 
single source, as opposed to the low quantity of DNA from 
multiple sources tested in Shaw.238 Overall, Dr. Chakraborty 
cautioned the court against relying on TrueAllele’s results given 
the complications of testing such low quantities of mixed DNA.239 
Dr. Chakraborty also testified that TrueAllele is not generally 
accepted in the scientific community and has not been subjected 
to rigorous peer-review because none of the validations completed 
on TrueAllele gave full details of the scenarios of the cases 
examined.240  
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. at 6–19 (discussing the testimony of the four witnesses). 
 233. Id. at 8. 
 234. Id. at 8–9. 
 235. Id. at 10–11. 
 236. Id. at 15. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. The order notes that “[o]n cross examination, [Dr. Chakraborty] 
acknowledged that the samples were mixtures of up to three people; some 
known and some unknown.” Id. 
 239. See id. at 14–15 (“From his research, [Dr. Chakraborty] has to be very 
careful about typing low copy number DNA or low input DNA samples 
particularly if these samples contain DNA mixture from multiple individuals.”).  
 240. Id. at 15. 
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With regards to the closed source code, Dr. Chakraborty 
testified that, in his opinion, an independent party could not 
recreate or validate TrueAllele results without the source code.241 
A second defense expert, Dr. Krane, testified that one important 
part of the scientific method is reproducibility.242 In other words, 
scientists must publish not only their results, but describe how 
they got to those results.243 Dr. Krane testified that TrueAllele 
has not disclosed this process.244 In addition, Dr. Krane testified 
that separate from the validation issue, the source code may be 
necessary for confrontation and accountability as well.245 Dr. 
Perlin testified that a scientist “can get very close to duplicating 
his work by reading his work. But if the scientist has not 
purchased the system he cannot duplicate it because he does not 
have all of the engineering details.”246 Finally, Dr. Perlin testified 
that the reliability of the source code is determined by testing and 
validation studies, not by reading the text of the source code 
itself.247 
The trial court considered the Daubert factors and concluded 
that “[b]oth the internal validation studies and peer review 
articles support the position that the TrueAllele Casework 
System has been tested.”248 The court further found, given the 
admission of TrueAllele in other jurisdictions, and the use of the 
technology in three laboratories, the new technology satisfies the 
“general acceptance” factor.249 Ultimately, the court found that 
“[b]ased on its consideration of the liberal factors set forth in 
Daubert[,] . . . the State’s expert witness and the TrueAllele 
System are reliable and, therefore, admissible . . . [and] the 
expert’s testimony is a matter of weight for the jury to 
consider.”250 
                                                                                                     
 241. Id. at 15–16. 
 242. Id. at 17. 
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B. TrueAllele Admissibility Issues 
The cases discussed above include several defense challenges 
to the admissibility of TrueAllele. In Foley, the defense attacked 
the “novelty” of the technology under the Frye standard.251 As 
TrueAllele continues to refine its technology, and courts continue 
to admit more qualitative interpretations of DNA evidence, the 
“novelty” challenge will become less persuasive. As seen in Shaw, 
one current objection to computerized DNA typing technologies is 
the inability to properly evaluate the scientific community’s 
acceptance of the technology.252 This concern rises from the fact 
that the commercial companies developing the technologies 
employ confidential laboratory protocols to protect alleged trade 
secrets.253 In their article DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of 
the New Genetic Identification Tests, William Thompson and 
Simon Ford point out that asserting a company’s procedures 
involve trade secrets essentially “shield[s] [the companies] from 
scrutiny by the scientific community at large.”254 This assertion 
places companies in a contradictory position: on the one hand, the 
companies want admissibility for their tests and argue that their 
procedures are sufficiently known and proven to be generally 
accepted by the scientific community.255 On the other hand, the 
companies want to keep their methods confidential.256 Thompson 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(engaging in a “novelty” analysis under Frye). 
 252. See Order at 6–19, Ohio v. Shaw, CR-13-575691 (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2014/TrueAllele-Casework-
Ruled-Admissible-in-Ohio-Daubert-Challenge/admissibility.pdf (including 
testimony from conflicting experts disputing the scientific community’s 
acceptance of TrueAllele). 
 253. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing, supra note 7, at 59 (“Efforts to 
evaluate scientific acceptance of a particular implementation of DNA typing 
technology may be hindered, however, by the desire of commercial laboratories 
to keep their laboratory protocols confidential in order to protect alleged trade 
secrets.”). 
 254. Id. at 59–60. 
 255. See id. (discussing how companies “seek admissibility for their tests, 
arguing that their procedures are sufficiently known and proven to be regarded 
as generally accepted by the scientific community”). 
 256. See id. (discussing how companies “seek to keep their tests confidential, 
arguing that they contain procedures or processes sufficiently unique and 
innovative to constitute trade secrets”). 
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and Ford warn that “[c]ourts would be well advised to tell these 
companies that they cannot have it both ways. If [the companies] 
wish to assert that their procedures are accepted, they must open 
themselves to scrutiny by the scientific community so that their 
assertion can be put to the test.”257  
Another issue surrounding TrueAllele’s admissibility is the 
risk of human manipulation of the data entered into the 
computer program and manipulation of the results produced. 
Inputting data into the TrueAllele software requires certain 
assumptions, such as the number of contributors to the DNA 
profile.258 In Duffy and Shaw, the experts disputed the exact 
number of contributors.259 Arguably, the number of contributors 
may affect the accuracy of the results.  
In addition to the human manipulation of the data entered 
into the system, TrueAllele, like all DNA statistical 
interpretations, is susceptible to human manipulation of the 
results. As discussed above, the TrueAllele system relies on a 
method of random statistical modeling.260 The randomization 
varies with every test run.261 In Duffy, Dr. Perlin ran the 
evidence sample four separate times in the TrueAllele system, 
producing four different likelihood ratios for incriminating the 
defendant: 389 million, 1.9 billion, 6.03 billion, and 17.8 billion.262 
                                                                                                     
 257. Id. 
 258. See Duffy & Shivers Transcript, supra note 179, at 37 (“[W]e’ll . . . make 
different assumptions which is required for any likely ratio [including the 
number of contributors].”). 
 259. See [2011] NICC (Crim) 37, at 51 (“[W]e’ll . . . [assume] I suppose there 
are two contributors if there’s clearly two contributors, fine, if there might be 
three, we’ll assume both two and three and produce values for all, for all 
possibilities considered.”); Order at 18, Ohio v. Shaw, CR-13-575691 (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2014/TrueAllele-
Casework-Ruled-Admissible-in-Ohio-Daubert-Challenge/admissibility.pdf. (Dr. 
Krane) (testifying that he reviewed a report that suggested that there was 
empirical evidence to support the conclusion that there are at last three 
contributors to that DNA mixture, not two contributors as input by TrueAllele) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 260. See supra Part III.D (discussing MCMC, the statistical modeling of 
TrueAllele).  
 261. See Duffy & Shivers Transcript, supra note 179, at 108 (“[I]f what you 
see is two identical traces then there is almost certainly human error because 
you are not going to see the same results twice unless you are using Photoshop 
or somebody made a mistake, you expect random variation.”). 
 262. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
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Ultimately, Dr. Perlin used the 6.03 billion result in court and 
discarded the lower results.263 The practical implication is that 
the 6.03 billion result made it more likely the sample belonged to 
the defendant than the 389 million or 1.9 billion results.264 
Defense attorneys may argue there are no standards or protocols 
to direct when Dr. Perlin should pick certain results over others. 
Cybergenetics has suggested, however, that prosecutors “[n]ever 
accept a DNA match result of under a million-to-one as definitive 
[because] [m]ore sophisticated interpretations can be done.”265 
According to Cybergenetics’ own suggestion, all three of Dr. 
Perlin’s results in Duffy (ranging from 389 million- to 17.8 billion-
to-one) would fall well within this standard. In addition, since 
Duffy, Cybergenetics has clarified its position on allowing juries 
and judges to see multiple DNA statistics: “It is perfectly 
acceptable for juries and judges to see multiple DNA match 
statistics. Reasonable people understand that using more of the 
data gives more information.”266 
V. TrueAllele and the Norms of Criminal Procedure: What is the 
Proper Admissibility Analysis? 
As seen in Duffy, Foley, and Shaw, courts structure their 
admissibility analysis of TrueAllele around “reliability.”267 But 
                                                                                                     
20 (discussing the four different likelihood ratios that correspond to the four 
separate times TrueAllele ran its software on a particular electropherogram). 
 263. See Duffy & Shivers Transcript, supra note 179, at 122–23 (presenting 
a likelihood ratio of 6.01 billion-to-one). 
 264. See Thompson, Controversial Forensic DNA Statistics, supra note 4, at 
20 (“These varying results illustrate the issue of reproducibility discussed 
above––they show that there is an element of uncertainty (a margin of error) in 
the likelihood ratios generated by the system.”). 
 265. Same Data, More Information: Murder, Match and DNA, THE DNA 
INVESTIGATOR (Cybergenetics, Philadelphia, PA), Fall 2009, at 3, 
http://www.cybgen.com/information/publication/2009/newsletter/Perlin-Same-
Data-More-Information-Murder-Match-and-DNA/newsletter.pdf (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(“Here, we find no legitimate dispute regarding the reliability of Dr. Perlin's 
testimony.”) (emphasis added); Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 
186, at 10 (“Fundamental to the admissibility of any scientific concept of this 
type is whether it is reliable and that has to be adequately validated . . . .”). 
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reliability is a flexible concept: sometimes focusing on the 
accuracy of the results, sometimes on the process leads to those 
results, and sometimes on what the relevant scientific community 
think about the process and results.268 The multiple dimensions 
of the reliability analysis spring from the interplay between two 
bedrock principles of criminal law and procedure: accuracy and 
fairness.269  
Ultimately, there is an inherent difficulty courts must 
manage when deciding whether to admit TrueAllele DNA 
interpretations because assessing the reliability of evidence 
requires courts examine both what is fair and what is accurate.270 
Are TrueAllele DNA interpretations reliable just because they 
are accurate? Is the process of TrueAllele fair to the defendant if 
the defendant may not be able to read the source code or directly 
reproduce results without purchasing the software? What if 
defense attorneys do not have the resources or information they 
need to make challenges to the technology? These are all 
questions that courts should grapple with when examining 
TrueAllele. Courts will inevitably have difficulty answering these 
questions because the two norms, accuracy and fairness, are 
inextricably linked.271 In other words, once accuracy is identified 
as a requirement, it is much more difficult for courts to give 
independent weight to a fairness requirement.272 The 
admissibility of TrueAllele may hinge on the court’s emphasis on 
one norm over another. At a minimum, courts should strive to 
consider and balance both norms in their analysis of the 
admissibility of computerized DNA technologies. 
Keeping these norms in the forefront of their minds, judges 
should engage in a dialogue, similar to that in Castro, with both 
                                                                                                     
 268. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (discussing the different 
definitions of reliability).  
 269. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 36–38 
(discussing accuracy and fairness). 
 270. See id. (giving additional examples of the interplay between fairness 
and accuracy such as the admissibility of coerced confessions and interrogation 
techniques, the right to remain silent, and the heavy beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard).  
 271. See id. at 38 (discussing the interplay between fairness and accuracy). 
 272. See id. (“[O]nce we have identified accuracy as an independent 
requirement, it is much more difficult to give content to a fairness 
requirement.”).  
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parties about the admissibility of TrueAllele. Courts should hold 
pre-trial evidentiary hearings to adequately assess the reliability 
and fairness of the new technology. In a state that uses the Frye 
standard, it is clear that one expert’s opinion, or even several 
experts’ opinions, may not satisfy the “general acceptance” 
standard.273 As late as 2011, Dr. Perlin noted that the relevant 
scientific community developing the new computerized DNA 
technologies only consists of 50 to 100 people.274 According to 
testimony in Duffy and Shaw, even this small community is 
divided regarding the verifiability of TrueAllele.275 Given the 
small size of the scientific community able to verify the new 
technology and this lack of agreement, courts should give pause 
when assessing the verifiability of TrueAllele under the Frye 
standard.  
While Daubert arguably created a more liberal admissibility 
standard than Frye,276 Daubert’s fifth factor still requires courts 
weigh the “general acceptance” of the scientific technology in the 
relevant scientific community.277 Given the difficult scientific 
nature of TrueAllele, judges may not serve as the best 
“gatekeepers” for this complicated technology.278 As a result, 
judges may rely almost exclusively on the fifth Daubert factor;279 
                                                                                                     
 273. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that the relevant 
scientific community as a whole must accept the technique). 
 274. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Perlin’s 
testimony in Regina v. Colin Duffy & Brian Shivers). 
 275. See Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 186, at 12–13 (noting 
that the defense expert in Duffy & Shivers comes within the broader scientific 
community that has concerns about the TrueAllele technology); Order at 17, 
Ohio v. Shaw, CR-13-575691 (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.cybgen.com/ 
information/press-release/2014/TrueAllele-Casework-Ruled-Admissible-in-Ohio-
Daubert-Challenge/admissibility.pdf (noting that the defense expert in Shaw 
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Lee Law Review). 
 276. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing the practical 
effects of Daubert). 
 277. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing Daubert’s use of 
Frye’s “general acceptance” test as its fifth factor). 
 278. Cf. supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (describing the Ninth 
Circuit’s begrudging response to the Supreme Court’s requirement that courts 
now use the Daubert standard to analyze complicated technologies). 
 279. See, e.g., Duffy & Shivers Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 186, at 16–17 
1076 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033 (2015) 
however, courts should resist absconding their duty to 
independently investigate the TrueAllele technology and weigh 
the other four Daubert factors.  
Ultimately, our legal system forces the prosecution to prove 
the “reliability” of their evidence in every case. The elusive 
definition of “reliability” gives courts wide discretion to balance 
accuracy and fairness how they see fit. Courts should thoroughly 
consider both the accuracy of the results and the fairness of the 
process and independently analyze emerging computerized DNA 
technologies.  
                                                                                                     
(discussing one international court’s almost exclusive reliance on the validation 
of the New York Commission on Forensic Science DNA Sub-Committee and the 
Committee’s recommendation that New York should adopt TrueAllele). 
